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INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM-DO THEY
ENCOURAGE OR IMPAIR BETTER
STATE GOVERNMENT?
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawmaking solely through the efforts of individual voters differs
greatly from American democracy's traditional form of representative
government. Lawmaking by the people accomplished through the
initiative and referendum has been widely accepted in this country
as a method for checking abuses by representatives and giving the
people a more direct voice in their government. Twenty-one states
permit their citizens, by petition, to propose new laws and seek the
rejection of legislation passed by traditional methods.' Nearly all of
these initiative and referendum provisions were adopted shortly after
the beginning of the twentieth century in reaction to the corruption and
unresponsiveness of state legislatures.2 Yet the question of whether
the people should be accorded a more active role in their government
persists today.3
Lively debate and empirical study of initiative and referendum
subsided in the 1940's and largely ended in the 1950's, yet many of the
1. The initiative and referendum provisions considered in this note include: ALAS.
CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-8; ARIz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § 1; CAL. CONST.
art. 2, §§ 8-10; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1; ME. CONST. art. IV,
pt. 3, §§ 17-20; MASS. CONST. amend art. 48; MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 9; Mo. CONST. art. 3,
§§ 49-53; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-4; NEV. CONST. art. XIX;
N.D. CONST. art. II, § 25; OHIO CONST. art. II, §§l-1 (g); OKLA. CONsT. art. 5, §§ 1-8;
ORE. CONsT. art. IV, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. II, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1; WASH.
CONsT. amends. 7, 30; WYO. CONST. art. 3, § 52. This paper deals only with the states
that provide general legislative initiative and referendum at the state level. Several
states offer only referendum. See, e.g., MD. CONsT. art. XVI; N.M. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
Other states may provide initiative and referendum at the local level, either generally
or in specific instances. Still other states authorize their legislature voluntarily to submit
laws to the electorate for their approval and some states require certain questions, such
as debt authorization, to be approved by the electorate. See THE COUNCIL OF THE STATES,
THE BOOK OF THE STATES 218 (1976-77).
2. R. LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF LAWMAKING BY
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 572 (1930) [hereinafter cited as R. LUcE]; Wilson, The Issues
of Reform, in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 69, 69-70 (W. Munro, ed. 1920).
See also J. BARNETT, THE OPERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL IN
OREGON 4 (1915).
3. The District of Columbia City Council on May 17, 1977, approved initiative,
referendum, and recall measures, which must be approved by the electorate and by
Congress before becoming law. The proposed measures would amend the District of
Columbia Charter, which is roughly equivalent to a state's constitution. Washington
Star, May 18, 1977, § B, at 1, col. 1.
Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota and Mark Hatfield of Oregon are currently
sponsoring a federal constitutional amendment allowing for initiative at the national
level. International Herald Tribune, August 1, 1977, at 6, col. 1.
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arguments for and against direct legislation by the people remain
viable.4 To facilitate consideration of initiative and referendum, this
note reviews, in a condensed manner, initiative and referendum law
and theory. In Part II, the terms initiative and referendum are defined
and the more common procedures described. Part III presents the
arguments for and against "direct legislation" concepts. 5 Part III also
considers the wisdom of adopting a system of direct legislation in a
state such as Florida,6 which currently employs only the constitutional
initiative. If the Constitution Revision Commission were to create an
initiative mechanism for statutory change-and encourage the use of
the statutory initiative by requiring less signatures than for a constitu-
tional initiative-this might contribute substantially toward keeping
inappropriate matter out of the Florida Constitution. Part IV, the
experience of states permitting direct legislation is reviewed. In con-
clusion, the authors present their observations on the utility of direct
legislation . 7
II. PROCEDURES AND PROVISIONS
Initiative and referendum provisions reserve direct lawmaking
power to the voters of the state. Initiative empowers a portion of the
voters to propose new legislation and thereafter the general electorate
to adopt or reject it at the polls. 8 The initiative extends positive legis-
4. See sources cited in notes 74-75 infra. Several arguments discussed in this note
focus on the ability of the public to communicate their preferences to their legislators
and to obtain adequate information about measures before voting on them. The reader
should therefore consider the arguments in light of the great advances in mass com-
munication in the past several decades. The authors doubt, however, that the public is
significantly better informed today on most issues; more information is available, but
public interest in digesting it is difficult to quantify.
5. The term "direct legislation" will be used synonymously with "initiative and
referendum." Except as indicated, direct legislation is not intended to imply the distinct-
tion that exists between the direct and indirect initiative. See text accompanying notes
25-33 infra.
6. Section III-D was prepared at the suggestion of the editors of the Florida State
University Law Review in light of the Florida Constitutional Revision Commission's
study of the feasibility of the statutory initiative. The authors wish to express their
appreciation for the research assistance for Section III-D provided by the Florida State
University Law Review.
7. This note addresses the use of initiative and referendum to alter statewide
statutory law. State constitutions frequently provide for the application of the initiative
and referendum principles to constitutional amendment and local government legisla-
tion. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3. See generally Sturm, The Procedure of State
Constitutional Change with Special Emphasis on the South and Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 569 (1977).
8. The initiative is used to amend laws and repeal laws no longer subject to the
referendum. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8. The initiative may be subject to some
restrictions. See note 43 and accompanying text infra.
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lating power and is used to correct legislative "sins of omission."9
Referendum, as described in this note, empowers voters to adopt or
reject statutes enacted by the legislature in the current or most recent
session.' 0 It is in effect a voter's veto over the action of the legislature,
and is used to correct the legislature's "sins of commission.""
Although defined as powers, initiative and referendum are best de-
scribed as procedures instituted and controlled by the voters to make
new laws and to approve the laws previously made by the legislature.
12
Voters circulate a petition to put the initiative or referendum measure
on the ballot. Although the specific components of the states' pro-
visions vary somewhat, certain patterns emerge which, along with
significant deviations, are set out in Table I, infra.
A. Precirculation Requirements
Only a few states' constitutional provisions require a proponent
to take specific action prior to the circulation of an initiative or referen-
dum petition;' 3 a larger number of states have statutes to that effect.'
4
9. As discussed in Parts III and IV of this note, the initiative is an alternative to
the traditional mode of legislation. Initiative is, however, a comparatively cumbersome
procedure which can take many months from its institution to final approval or rejec-
tion at the polls. Additionally, the initiative is not a "pure" manifestation of democracy:
although the final decision is made by the majority of voters, both organization and
resources are required to place a proposal on the ballot.
10. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9. The referendum often is restricted in scope.
See note 58 and accompanying text infra.
11. The referendum, discussed in Parts III and IV of this note, enables the voters
to oversee the actions of the legislature. Like the veto, the referendum must be in-
stituted shortly after enactment or not at all. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text
infra. The referendum differs from the veto in that some legislative actions are immune
from referendum, while most legislative actions are subject to the veto. See notes 55-61
and accompanying text infra.
12. The three regular branches of government are continually in existence and
capable of protecting their institutional integrity. The initiative and referendum have
no institutional existence and take on life only when exercised by the voters, but
popularly enacted legislation has a legal effect remarkably similar to that of legislatively
enacted legislation. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text infra.
13. ALAS. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (an application containing the bill must be signed by
100 voters and filed with the lieutenant governor); CAL.. CoNsT. art. II, § 10(d) (prior to
circulation of an initiative or referendum petition, a copy must be submitted to the
Attorney General who then prepares a title and summary); ME. CoNsT. art. IV, § 20
(petition forms shall be furnished or approved by the Secretary of State upon written
application signed in the office of the Secretary) ; MAss. CONsT. amend. art. 48 Init., pt. 2,
§ 3 & Ref. pt. 3, § 3 (the petition, signed by ten voters, shall be filed by the first
Wednesday in August with the Attorney General who then certifies the title, form, and
content; the Secretary of the Commonwealth provides additional blanks); Wvo. CONsT.
art. III, § 52 (b) (an application containing the bill is to be signed by 100 voters
and submitted to the Secretary of State).
14. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-101.
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If required, a precirculation application usually must contain the text
of the proposed measure and the signatures of a relatively small
number of voters.15 A state officer determines whether the form of the
proposed measure is proper and insures that the petition is correctly
drawn.16 In most states, statutes regulate drafting and circulation of
petitions17 although the constitutional provision may establish some
basic requirements. 18
B. Petition Requirement
To qualify a measure for submission to the voters, the proponents
must collect a required number of signatures, expressed as a per-
centage 9 of the number of voters participating in a prior general
election.'0 The percentage is usually higher for constitutional initia-
tives, where they are permitted,2' than for legislative initiatives, which
is in turn higher than the percentage required for legislative referen-
dum. 22 In addition, some states require that the signatures be dis-
tributed geographically, typically providing that a designated propor-
tion of the qualified electors signing the petition must reside in a pro-
portion of the subdivisions of the state.2
15. Alaska and Wyoming require 100 signatures. ALAS. CONST. art. XI, § 2; Wyo.
CONsT. art. 3, § 52 (b). Maine requires one signature. ME. CONST. art. IV, § 20. Most
other states are within this range.
16. Review of measures before circulation may also permit the state to determine
that the initiative measure or one substantially similar to it has not been submitted
recently to the voters, MASS. CONsT. amend, art. 47, Init., pt. 3, § 3; and to prepare
a title and summary, CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(d). Denial of certification sometimes is
made subject specifically to judicial review. See, e.g., Wyo. CONST. art. XI, § 2. Arkansas
also requires that the measure be published in a newspaper of general circulation 30
days before filing. ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § 1. An additional reason to require precircula-
tion filing is to limit the amount of time during which signatures may be collected. The
requirement of a certain number of signatures within a limited time insures active
support for the proposed measure among the qualified electors. This requirement is
built into the Massachusetts Constitution. See note g to Table I. For material relating
to ballot pamphlets, see notes 100 & 148 and accompanying text infra.
17. See, e.g., AIuz. REV. STAT. §§ 19-101-116.
18. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § 1 (the initiative petition shall contain a full
text of the measure proposed).
19. North Dakota differs by setting its signature requirements in terms of whole
numbers. N.D. CONST. art. II, § 25. See Table I.
20. Most states use the total vote for the office of governor at the prior regular
gubernatorial election. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § § 8(b), 9(b). A few other states use
similar criteria. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 2 (total vote for office receiving the
highest number of votes); ALAS. CONsT. art. XI, § ) (number of voters participating in
prior election).
21. Not all states having an initiative provision permit its use for constitutional
amendment. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17-20.
22. For a comparison within each state and among the states, see Table I.
23. The geographical distribution requirement is in addition to the required
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C. Initiative Procedure
The provisions generally set no absolute deadline for filing a legis-
lative or constitutional initiative petition, 24 so failure to meet a deadline
is not disqualifying as it would be for a referendum petition. 25 For an
initiative, the deadline is relative, and failure to meet it merely
delays the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the measure.2 6 Under a
direct initiative procedure the legislature has no opportunity to act
on the measure prior to submission to the electors.2 7 The "direct initia-
tive" petition usually must be filed four months before the election
at which it will be considered,2 8 so that failure to meet the deadline
delays the vote until the next regular election.2 9 This delay can be
ameliorated in those states with procedures permitting a special elec-
tion to consider the measure, but such elections can be called only
at the discretion of the governor or the legislature, or by a voters'
petition.3° Under an "indirect initiative" procedure the legislature has
number of signatures. ALAS. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (residents in at least two-thirds of the
election districts); ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § 1 (at least one-half the designated percentage
from each of fifteen counties); NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 2-3 (5% of the voters in each
of two-fifths of the counties for an initiative); NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (10% in at
least 75% of the counties, initiative only) ; OHIO CONST. art. II, § l(g) (at least one-half
the designated percentage from each of one-half of the counties); WYo. CONST. art. III,
§ 52(c) (resident in at least two-thirds the counties). Missouri requires the designated
percentages in each of two-thirds of the congressional districts. Mo. CONST. art. III, §§
50 and 52(a).
24. See, e.g., ALAs. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (file at any time).
25. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text infra. This is the general interpretation
of the different provisions, but in some instances, an absolute deadline for filing after
a precirculation filing may be imposed.
26. Initiative petitions are generally valid regardless of when filed. If they are filed
too close to the time of election, they may be placed on a subsequent ballot. The logic
of the requirement in the Alaska Constitution, which dictates that it is irrelevant when
the petition is filed, requires as much. ALAS. CONsT. art. XI, § 4. But courts have held
that a petition can lapse, at least where the required number of signatures is barely
collected or barely not collected. See, e.g., Gage v. Jordan, 147 P.2d 387 (Cal. 1944). On
the other hand, if the opportunity to exercise the referendum is unused, it is lost forever,
much like the executive veto.
27. The relative merits of direct and indirect initiative are discussed briefly in
Parts III and IV of this note. In summary, indirect initiative contemplates the initiation
of legislation by the legislature; direct initiative, on the other hand, deals with the
initiation of legislation by the electorate. Indirect initiative appears to have three ad-
vantages over the direct version. First, legislative debate of the strengths and weaknesses
can increase voter awareness; second, allowing the legislature to propose alternative
measures can save poorly drafted proposals containing good ideas, see note 100 and
accompanying text infra; and third, the expense of the complete initiative procedure
can be avoided if the legislature enacts the measure.
28. Some states use different periods. See Table I.
29. See note 26 supra.
30. See, e.g., ARK. CONsT. amend. 7, § 1 (petition by 15% of voters); CAL. CONST.
art. II, § 9(c) (governor may call); MONT. CONST. art. III, § 6 (legislature may call).
1977]
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an opportunity to consider the measure before it is placed on the
ballot.3 1 The typical provision states that the petition must be filed a
specified length of time prior to the convening of the legislature.
3 2 If
the legislature enacts the measure without amendment,3 or enacts
"substantially the same" measure,3 4 the initiative petition is declared
void and the procedure is ended-3 Some state constitutional provisions
make the enacted measure subject to the referendum procedure,3 6 but
this would seem to make initiated measures no different from any
other measure enacted into law by the legislature.3 T If the legislature
rejects the initiated measure, some states permit the legislature to pro-
pose alternative measures to be placed on the ballot with the original
measure .3  The voters are then permitted to choose between the
measures or reject both.39 In any event, if the legislature rejects the
31. Seven state constitutions have the indirect initiative procedure. ALAS. CONST.
art. XI, § 4 (the procedure is timed so that one legislative session occurs between the
filing and the balloting; enactment of "substantially the same" measure terminates the
initiative procedure); ME. CONsT. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18 (legislature can enact the measure
as proposed or can propose an alternative to present to the voters); MAss. CONST. amend.
art. 48 Init., pt. 5, § 1 (a voter petition signed by 3% submits the measure to the
legislature; if the legislature fails to act within the allotted time, and if the signatures
of an additional 11/c% are submitted, the measure and any alternatives proposed by
the legislature are put before the voters); MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9 (if the legislature
does not enact or reject the proposed measure within 40 session days, it and a proposed
alternative measure shall be submitted to the voters); NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (petition
must be filed within 30 days prior to legislative session; if legislature fails to act within
40 days it shall be submitted to the voters); OHIO CONST. art. II, § lb (a petition signed
by 3% presents the matter to the legislature; if the legislature fails to act within four
months, and if additional signatures amounting to 3% are submitted, either the original
measure or the measure as amended by the legislature shall be put before the voters);
WASH. CONsT. amend. 7, § l(a) (submitted to legislature if filed at least 10 days before
convening of legislature; legislature may enact measure or propose alternative; otherwise,
it is submitted directly to voters); WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52 (the procedure is timed
so that one legislative session falls between the filing and the balloting; enactment of
"substantially the same" measure terminates the procedure). Utah's statute provides for
submission to the legislature upon the filing of petitions containing the signatures of
5% of the voters, 10 days prior to convening. If rejected, an additional 5%, totalling
signatures constituting 10% of the votes cast for governor in the preceding election,
must be collected to submit the proposal to the voters. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-11-2. Filing
a petition initially containing the signatures of 10% of the voters submits the measure
directly to the voters. Id., § 20-11-3. See note 127 infra.
32. See Table I.
33. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9.
34. See, e.g., AiAs. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
35. See note 27 supra.
36. See, e.g., NEv. CONST. art. XIX, § 3.
37. The referendum procedure applies to legislated matters except certain restricted
items. See notes 51-56 and accompanying text infra. Some states limit the ability of the
legislature to amend or repeal initiative statutes. See notes 66-69 and accompanying text
infra.
38. See note 31 supra.
39. The typical scheme requires the submission of all proposed measures to the
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measure or declines to act upon it within the time allotted by the
provision,4° the measure will be put on the ballot at the next regular
or special election.4'1
The most common restrictions on the use of the initiative prohibit
proposals concerning appropriations or reconsidering measures initiated
and rejected by the voters within the previous three years. 42 Unlike the
referendum, the initiative is restricted as to subject in only a few
states.
41
D. Referendum Procedures
Some states provide that either the voters or the legislature can
refer recent legislative acts to the electors; other states allow only the
voters to begin the process of referendum." The proposal of a referen-
dum by petition requires a specified percentage of signatures 5 and
may require a geographic distribution of the signers." Referendum
provisions almost universally require that the petitions be filed either
(1) within ninety days of the enactment of the measure4 7 or (2) before
the adjournment of the legislative session in which the measure was
passed." A sizeable number of states provide that a legislative measure
voters for their vote on each. In the event that two or more conflicting measures are
approved, the measure receiving the highest number of votes becomes law. See, e.g.,
NEB. CONST. art. Il, § 2. Several states, however follow different rules. See, e.g., ME.
CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, § 18 (voters can choose between competing measures or reject
both; if neither receives a majority, the one receiving the most votes, if more than one-
third of the votes cast, shall be submitted at the next general election).
40. See, e.g., MICH. CONsT. art. II, § 9 (40 days); OHIO CONsT. art. II, § 16 (four
months).
41. See note and accompanying text 26 supra.
42. ALAS. CONsT. art. XI, § 7 (cannot dedicate revenues, make or repeal appropria-
tions, create courts, define jurisdiction of courts, prescribe court rules, enact local or
special legislation); MAss. CONST. amend. art. 48, Init., pt. 2, § 2 (prohibits matters re-
lating to religion, appointment of judges, reversal of judicial decisions, powers and crea-
tion of courts, local matters, specific appropriations); Mo. CONsT. art. III, § 51 (cannot
make appropriations where new revenues are not also created); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2
(void if submitted within three years); NEv. CONsT, art. XIX, § 6 (cannot make appro-
priations where new revenues are not also created); OHIO CONsT. art. II, § le (cannot
vary the scheme of property taxation); OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 6 (measure rejected by
voters through initiative and referendum within three years cannot be proposed by less
than 25% of voters); Wyo. CoNrs. art. III, § 52(a) (cannot dedicate revenues, make or
repeal appropriations, create courts, enact local or special legislation).
43. Compare note 42 supra with note 61 infra. At the very least, the initiative may
not be used to enact statutes which are beyond the power of the legislature to enact.
See text accompanying notes 65-69 infra.
44. See Table I.
45. See note 19 supra and Table I.
46. See note 23 supra.
47. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(b).
48. See, e.g., Wyo. CoNsT. art. V, § 52(e). See Table I.
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referred to the voters shall be suspended pending the election, 49 al-
though some states permit emergency statutes ° to go into effect im-
mediately and remain in effect until rejected by the voters.51 Other
states provide that no act of the legislature shall become effective until
ninety days after the adjournment of that session of the legislature. 52
In these states a referred measure remains in abeyance until approved
by the voters. A third group of states provides that the acts of the
legislature shall remain in effect until specifically rejected by the
voters.53 A few states provide that the referred measure shall be sus-
pended only upon the submission of additional signatures. 54
By far the most frequent restriction upon the operation of the
referendum is the emergency statute. 5  These statutes, defined as those
measures immediately necessary for the preservation of the public
peace, health and safety, 56 either may be wholly exempt from the
referendum procedure, 51 or suspension of the measure's effect may be
postponed until its final rejection at the polls. 58 Some states require a
separate proviso in an emergency statute stating why immediate
effectiveness is necessary. 59 Other states require passage by a greater-
than-majority vote.60
49. ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(a); COLO. CONST. art. V, §
1; IDAHO CODE § 34-1803; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9; Mo. CONST. art. III, § 52(a); N.D.
CONST. art. II, § 25; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 3; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 2-1-2. Some
states provide that the measure is suspended, see, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9, al-
though others say that the measure becomes effective only upon approval by the voters,
see, e.g., OKLA. CONsT. art. V, § 3. See Table I.
50. See note 56 and accompanying text inIra.
51. Arkansas, Massachusetts and North Dakota use this procedure. See note 49 supra.
52. ARIz. CONsT. art. IV, pt. I, §§ 1(3), (4)-(5); ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 3, §§ 16-17;
MAsS. CONsT. amend. art. 48, Ref., pt. 1; OHIo CONST. art. II, § Ic; ORE. CONST. art. IV,
§ I(3)(a); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-11-5 (no law effective for 60 days unless passed by
two-thirds votes); WASH. CONST. amend. 7, §§ l(c)-l(d). Florida's constitution presently
provides that "[e]ach law shall take effect on the sixtieth day after adjournment sine
die of the session of the legislature." FLA. CONST. art. 3, § 9.
53. See, e.g., ALAs. CONsr. art. XI, § 6; NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 1(2); WYO. CONST.
art. HI, § 52(f).
54. E.g., MONT. CONsT. art. III, § 5(2) (the measure is referred by 5%, suspended
if petition is signed by 15%); NaB. CONST. art. III, § 3 (measure referred by 5% suspended
if the petition is signed by 10%).
55. Most initiative and referendum provisions refer to emergency statutes, usually
by definition. California refers simply to "urgency statutes." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a).
56. E.g., Wyo. CONsT. art. 3, § 52(g). The wording may vary slightly, but the
three omnipresent concepts are necessity, immediacy, and preservation of the public
peace, health or safety.
57. E.g., CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 9(a); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; ME. CONST. art. IV, pt.
3, § 17; OHIo CONST. art. II, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2; ORE. CONST. art. IV, §
1(3)(a).
58. See note 51 supra.
59. E.g., ARIz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(3).
60. Id. (two-thirds vote of all elected members in both houses). Contra, ALAS. CONST.
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Next to emergency statute limitations the most common restriction
on the power of referendum is the exemption of appropriations for the
support and maintenance of state government and state institutions.6 1
The referred measures are then submitted at the next regular or special
election.6 2
E. Approval, Veto, Amendment, and Repeal
The petitioning feature makes the initiative and referendum pro-
cedures distinctive in lawmaking. Of course, neither procedure ends
with the submission and administrative approval of petitions. At the
very least the measure must be put before the voters, and some states
have particular requirements as to what constitutes passage. Most states
determine voter approval of measures placed before the electorate by a
simple majority,63 although a few states require not only a majority
but a certain proportion of the total vote cast at that election or a
previous election. 4
The executive's veto power usually does not apply to statutes sub-
mitted to and approved by the voters.6 The states are divided, however,
upon the ability of the legislature to amend and repeal initiative and
art. XI, § 7 (no mention of how a measure becomes an emergency statute).
61. ALAS. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (dedication of revenue, appropriations, local or special
legislation, emergency statutes); Asuz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(3) (emergency statutes,
support of state government and institutions); ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § 1 (no restric-
tions); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 9(a) ("urgency" statutes, statutes calling elections, tax levies,
appropriations for the usual current expenses of the state); COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1
(emergency statutes, support of state government and institutions); IDAHO CONsT. (no
restrictions); ME. CONsT. art. IV, pt. 3, § 17 (emergency statutes); MAss. CONST. amend.
art. 48, Ref., pt. 3, § 2 (matters relating to religion, to appointment of judges, creation
of courts, local matters, appropriations for usual current expenses of state and its
institutions); MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9 (appropriations for state institutions or to meet
deficiencies in state funds); Mo. CONST. art. III, § 52(a) (emergency statutes, appropria-
tions for the usual current expenses of state government, support of public schools);
MONT. CONSr. art. III, § 5 (appropriations); NEB. CONST. art. III, § 3 (support of
state government or institutions); NEv. CONST. art. XIX, § 6 (no restriction); OHIo CONST.
art. II, § ld (tax levies, appropriations, for support of state government and institutions,
emergency statutes); OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 2 (emergency statutes); ORE. CONST. art. IV, §
28 (emergency statutes); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 2-1-3 (emergency statutes, support
of state government and institutions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-11-4 (statutes passed by
two-thirds vote in each house); WASH. CONST. amend. 7, § l(b) (emergency statutes,
support of state government and institutions); WYo. CONST. art. III, § 52(g) (dedications
of revenue, appropriations, local and special legislation, emergency statutes).
62. See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra. See also Table I.
63. E.g., OsRE. CONST. art. IV, § l(4)(d).
64. E.g., MAss. CONST. amend. art. 48, init., pt. 5, § 1 (passage of initiative measure
by majority of votes case on the measure that is at least 30% of the vote cast at that
election); WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52(f) (adoption or rejection by vote in excess of 50%
of the vote cast in the preceding general election).
65. E.g., ARuz. CONsT. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(6).
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referendum statutes. A sizeable proportion make no mention of any
restriction upon the power of the legislature. Some states differentiate
between initiative statutes and referendum statutes: they permit the
legislature to amend or repeal the latter at will, but forbid the legisla-
ture to amend or repeal the former, either absolutely or in the absence
of a greater-than-majority vote.67 A few states restrict the power of the
legislature to amend or repeal both initiative and referendum
statutes. 6s Although only a few states so provide, 9 it would seem that
an initiated or referred statute could be amended or repealed by use
of the initiative process. A substantial minority of states extend the
powers of initiative and referendum to the voters of localities, and
leave the details and the administration of these procedures to the
affected jurisdictions.7 0
In State ex rel. Dahl v. Dewing, 131 N.W.2d 434 (N.D. 1964), the court took this
exception one step further and held an executive veto of an appropriation for a post
created by initiative to be unconstitutional. That case, however, involved an express
constitutional prohibition on the executive's veto over statutes created by initiative. The
opposite result is conceivable if the initiative section of the constitution is silent as to
whether the veto pertains and the veto power encompasses all legislation.
66. The constitutions of Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah provide that initiative and referendum
laws may be amended by any subsequent legislature. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-11-6.
For citations to the constitutional provisions of these states, see note 1 supra. But a
statute amended by the legislature does not lose its identity as an initiative statute.
State ex rel. Dahl v. Dewing, 131 N.W.2d 434 (N.D. 1964). This can be of great im-
portance since the governor's veto will not apply. Id.
67. ALAs. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (initiative law cannot be repealed within two years of
enactment; amendable at any time); CAL. CONsT. art. II, § 10(c) (legislature may amend or
repeal initiative statute by another statute effective only when approved by voters);
MICH. CONsT. art. II, § 9 (amendment or repeal only by three-quarters vote of all mem-
bers elected to and serving in both houses; MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 9 (amendment and
repeal only by three-quarters vote); WYO. CONsT. art. III, § 52(f) (no repeal of initiative
law within two years of effective date; amendable at any time).
68. ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6) (no power to amend or repeal); ARK. CONST.
amend. 7, § 1 (only on two-thirds vote of legislature); NEV. CONST. art. XIX, §§ 1 and
2(3) (no power to amend, repeal or suspend referendum laws at any time, initiative
laws within three years); N.D. CoNsr. art II, § 25 (only on two-thirds vote of elected
members); WASH. CONST. amend. 26 (no law approved by a majority of the electors
shall be amended or repealed within two years of enactment).
69. E.g., MICH. CONsT. art. 2, § 9. Cf. ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt. 1, § 1(6) (legislature
may not amend or repeal a statute derived by initiative or referendum); CAL. CONST. art.
2, § 10(c) (legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes, but only a referendum
statute can repeal an initiative unless the initiative provides otherwise).
70. See Table I. The procedures may vary from those used at the state level and
may be established either by the legislature or the relevant locality. The initiative
used by the voters of the locality cannot be used to legislate in areas not authorized
by the state's constitution or delegation statutes. It should be noted the initiative and
referendum are extended to localities where those powers are not reserved to the voters
at the state level.
In addition to those states covered in Table I, the following states have an initiative
process available only to local governmental units: Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minne-
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The statutory law resulting from the initiative procedure differs, if
at all, from the laws made by the legislature primarily in the ways
initiative statutes may be amended and repealed, as previously dis-
cussed.71 The courts tend not to recognize distinctions owing to the
origin of a given statute, and have held that initiative statutes are "of
equal dignity with those passed by the Legislative Assembly ' ' 72 and
that "rules of construction apply equally to direct legislation by the
people as to legislative enactment.
' '7 3
III. BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENTS
A. An Historical Perspective
Initiative and referendum are relatively new terms for very old
procedures. Ancient democracies, such as the Greek city-states, utilized
direct democracy by plebiscite.7 4 To some degree, the Saxons governed
themselves through a popular assembly.75 From colonial times in
America the electorate in some states has been required to review legis-
lation of certain types before it could become law. 76 The initiative
gained acceptance slowly, in part because it was thought to undermine
the guarantee of a "republican form of government" found in the
United States Constitution. 7
7
Not until 1898 did a state adopt statewide initiative and referen-
dum measures that the electorate could invoke to consider almost any
issue.78 South Dakota, like the states which followed its lead, adopted
a variation of the Swiss initiative and referendum procedures, which
had become popular after the adoption of the referendum by a lone
Swiss canton in 183 1.7  Reformists urging the enactment of direct
sota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and West
Virginia. THE COUNCIL OF THE STATES, THE BOOK OF THE STATES (1976-77) 218 (Table
7 & n.c). All states have referendum available to local governmental units except Ala-
bama, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, New Hampshire, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Id. at 216-17 (Table 6 & n.c).
71. See text accompanying notes 63-69 supra.
72. State ex rel. Jones v. Erickson, 244 P. 287, 290 (1926).
73. Washington State Dept. of Revenue v. Hoppe, 512 P.2d 1094, 1096 (1973)
(en banc).
74. Munro, Introduction, in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 4 (W. Munro
ed. 1920) [hereinafter cited as Munro].
75. R. LUCE, supra note 2, at 563; Munro, supra note 74, at 4.
'76. In 1638 Plymouth Colony adopted a form of referendum. For an excellent dis-
cussion of the history of direct legislation, see R. LUCE, supra note 2, at 563-73.
77. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. The argument that initiative and referendum denied
the people of a state a republican form of government eventually reached the Supreme
Court. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the matter, labelling the
issue a political question. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
78. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1.
79. The original referendum adopted in the German-speaking canton of Saint Gallen
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legislation provided the impetus for adoption of initiative and referen-
dum in twelve more states by 1911.80 By 1924 eighteen states had
adopted the initiative or referendum.81
B. The Arguments for Initiative and Referendum
The first of several categories of argument in favor of initiative
and referendum is that direct legislation as a governing technique is
purer than, and therefore preferable to, representative government.
Believing that the individual is sovereign, students of Rousseau8 2 have
argued that direct legislation should be a vital part, if not the moving
force, of government. 3 Because initiatives and referenda theoretically
address issues rather than personalities, proponents long have argued
that voters act more objectively in considering direct legislation and
that greater objectivity means greater accuracy in expressing the public
will. 4 Intent upon dispelling the charge that direct legislation opens
the door to "mob rule," supporters of direct legislation have countered
that nominating conventions and even town meetings are far more
provided that laws took effect 45 days after enactment unless a petition signed by 50
voters was submitted demanding that the law be referred to the communal assembly.
A majority of all registered voters had to reject a measure to prevent its becoming law.
R. LUCE, supra note 2, at 565.
The first initiative provision was adopted by the Swiss canton of Vaud in 1845. By
1930 the statutory initiative existed in all but three cantons, the constitutional initiative
in all but one. Id. at 566.
80. Utah, 1900; Oregon, 1902; Nevada, 1904 (which adopted only the referendum
at that time); Montana, 1906; Oklahoma, 1907, Maine and Missouri, 1908; Arkansas and
Colorado, 1910; and Arizona, California and New Mexico, 1911 (New Mexico adopted
only the referendum). All but three of these states have retained their original provisions.
See citations in note 1 supra. Arkansas, California, and Missouri have modified or moved
their provisions. Compare ARK. CONST. amend. 10 (1910) with ARK. CONST. amend. 7, § 1;
CAL. CONsT. art IV, § 1 (1911) with CAL. CONsT. art. II, §§ 8-10; Mo. CONST. art. 4,
§ 57 (1908) with Mo. CoNST. art. 3, § 57.
81. R. LucE, supra note 2, at 573.
82. The most prominent advocate of the theory of direct democracy was Jean Jacques
Rousseau, who believed that political liberty could be preserved only through constant
participation in government by all members of society. See J. RoussEAu, CONTRAT SOCIAL
(Paris 1762).
83. J. LAPALOMBRA, THE INrrIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN OREGON: 1938-1948 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as J. LAPALOMBRA]; Bourne, A Defence of Direct Legislation, in THE
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 194 (W. Munro ed. 1913) [hereinafter cited as
Bourne]. The authors found no one who insisted that representative government should
be abolished, although at least one commentator suggested it take a "subordinate place."
Radin, Popular Legislation in California: 1936-1946, 35 CAL. L. REV. 171, 188 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as Radin], quoting Shafer, A Teutonic Institution Revived, 22 YALE
L.J. 398, 406 (1913).
84. Munro, supra note 74, at 22; Rappard, The Initiative and Referendum in Switzer-
land, 6 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 345, 365 (1912) [hereinafter cited as Rappard]. Contra, R.
LucE, supra note 2, at 625.
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susceptible to spontaneous ignition by radical elements. 8 5 Furthermore,
if the large number of bills considered by each legislator each session
is compared to the relatively small number of initiated and referred
measures considered by the individual voter, the voter appears to have
a better opportunity to become knowledgeable of the issues.86
A second line of argument favors direct legislation as a tool for
eliminating flaws in the representative system. The exercise of the
powers of initiative and referendum effectively checks the corruption
of legislatures by powerful special interest groups.8 7 Proponents have
claimed that direct legislation also serves an important function if
representatives are sincere but mistaken in their beliefs as to what the
people want or what is in their best interests. By exercising the initia-
tive or referendum process the people can effectuate their will on a
specific issue without the necessity of voting good representatives out
of office.A Even if the powers of initiative and referendum are rarely
exercised, proponents urge, they operate as the "gun behind the
door,"8 19 a sobering reminder to legislators that a miscast vote or failure
to act on an important issue may spark adverse publicity and action
by the electorate.9 0 Proponents also have asserted that the availability
of the direct legislation process increases participation in government
by public-minded citizens who are unable to become involved on a
full-time basis.91
A third line of argument focuses on resulting improvements in the
electorate. Increased voter involvement in the affairs of government
suggests a better educated electorate. Proponents have predicted that
contested issues would become the subject of exhaustive public debate
85. Johnson, Direct Legislation as an Ally of Representative Government, in THE
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 139, 152 (W Munro ed. 1913) [hereinafter cited
as Johnson].
86. J. LAPALOMBRA, supra note 83, at 141-12; Bourne, supra note 83, at 207-08. See
text accompanying notes 100-01 infra.
For example, during the 1977 Florida legislative session, 2,336 bills were introduced
in the House and 1,492 in the Senate. History of Legislation, 1977 Regular Session, Pre-
pared by Legislative Information Division, Joint Management Committee.
87. Bourne, supra note 83, at 199; Munro, supra note 74, at 20. Unpopular or
corrupt judges also can be checked by the initiative process. For example, in August,
1977, voters in Madison, Wisconsin removed a judge because of his remarks following a
rape trial. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1977, at 1, col. 3.
88. Johnson, supra note 85, at 147; Diamond, California's Political Reform Act:
Greater Access to the Initiative Process, 7 Sw. U.L. REV. 453, 462 n.34 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Diamond], quoting State of California, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution
of the State of California, with Legislative Reasons For and Against Adoption Thereof
(Oct. 10, 1911).
89. R. LUCE, supra note 2, at 632.
90. See generally Wilson, The Issues of Reform, in THE INrrTATIVE, REFERENDUM,
AND RECALL 69, 87-88 (W. Munro ed. 1913).
91. Johnson, supra note 85, at 151,
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once the public possessed the power of final disposition.92 Backers of
direct legislation also have anticipated a diminution in the electorate's
feeling of impotence-the "there's-nothing-I-can-do-about-it," syn-
drome. By reducing the average citizen's feeling of helplessness in assert-
ing her will, initiative and referendum might increase voter enter-
prise and concern.93
C. The Arguments Against Initiative and Referendum
The proponents of representative government argue that the whole
of society, as distinct from the majority that controls under a program
of direct legislation, is not served best by the expressions of an
amorphous popular will, but that the general social good is advanced
by reliance upon the corporate wisdom of elected representatives.94
Legislative lawmaking, when compared to lawmaking by a plebescite
such as initiative and referendum, is relatively efficient. The members
of a legislative body can gain a measure of expertise which enables
them corporately to promulgate laws that serve the community as a
whole. As a discrete body, the legislature is more easily petitioned and
educated by those who do not have the resources to convey their
message to the general electorate. Assuming that the availability of
direct legislation will result in its widescale substitution for representa-
tive legislation, some detractors have forecast socialism and even
anarchy.99 One of these critics has asserted that democracy, especially
in its purer forms such as direct legislation, is not a prerequisite of
individual liberty. 6 The failure of ancient direct democracy, suggest
some commentators, may be one reason that the framers of the United
States Constitution were strong proponents of representative govern-
ment.97 .
Critics of direct legislation have forecast a decrease in the quality
of legislators commensurate with the decline in responsibility borne
by the legislature. They assert this decline will occur because direct
92. Munro, supra note 74, at 2, 21; Johnson, supra note 85, at 153. Contra, R. LUCE,
supra note 2, at 627.
93. Munro, supra note 74, at 2.
94. See generally E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (London 1790);
J. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1875). For excerpts from se-
lected works, see REPRESENTATION (H. Pitkin ed. 1969).
95. Littleton, Mob Rule and the Canonized Minority, in 7 THE CONsTrrmnONAL RE-
VIEW 86, 90 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Littleton]; see Campbell, The Initiative and
Referendum, 10 MICH. L. REV. 427, 428 (1912) [hereinafter cited as Campbell]; McCall,
Representative as Against Direct Legislation, in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL
164, 166-67 (W. Munro ed. 1913) [hereinafter cited as McCall].
96. Littleton, supra note 95, at 90. Contra, J. LAPALOMBRA, supra note 83, at 102.
97. Campbell, supra note 95, at 428; McCall, supra note 95, at 166.
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legislative power vested in the people reduces the power of elected
legislators. 9 A related argument suggests that once legislators realize
that the people can and will initiate measures not as carefully refined
as legislatively enacted laws, the incentive to "fine tune" statutes
through legislative debate and compromise will disappear.'" This fear
of poorly drafted initiatives often is reflected in another opposing argu-
ment, namely, that initiative and referendum, even if they are not
detrimental to representative government, are inherently defective
methods of legislating.00
Opposers of initiative and referendum have argued that special
interests will "oil" the direct legislation machinery to get the desired
results just as they buy and barter under the representative system." 1
The critics conclude that a major purpose of direct legislation-to
assure the average citizen a voice in government-will be achieved
rarely. These critics argue that a well-organized and heavily funded
minority can block any initiative at the polls, and they conclude that
problems of the average citizen can be solved through direct legislation
only if the measure is not opposed by a powerful special interest
group.10 2
A host of other alleged weaknesses in direct legislation would tend
to compound its vulnerability to special interests. The electorate has
always voted in smaller numbers for measures than for candidates. 0 3
Naturally, critics have emphasized that light participation permits a
relatively small percentage of the electorate to pass a law.10 4 Opponents
have also claimed that complex issues and numerous measures on
each ballot render intelligent decisionmaking by the voters an im-
possibility;' 0 ' this is contrasted with the careful deliberations of a
98. E. OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 512 (1912) [hereinafter cited as
E. OBERHOLTZER]; McCall, supra note 95, at 178; Munro, supra note 74, at 25.
99. See generally Campbell, supra note 95, at 428. In some states that utilize the
direct initiative, the initiated matter is not subject to amendment prior to election.
100. Id. at 428, 430-31; Holman, The Unfavorable Results of Direct Legislation in
Oregon, in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 279, 282-83 (W. Munro ed. 1913)
[hereinafter cited as Holman]; Munro, supra note 74, at 25.
101. R. LUCE, supra note 2, at 623-24 (suggesting that money spent lobbying the
legislature could be diverted to initiative or referendum publicity; but bribery is im-
practical at the public level although effective in legislatures); E. OBERHOLTZER, supra
note 98, at 502-03; Munro, supra note 74, at 30-31.
102. Munro, supra note 74, at 31. But see notes 145-47 and accompanying text infra.
103. See note 148 infra.
104. Holman, supra note 100, at 283-85.
105. Campbell, supra note 95, at 431 (discussing extraordinary length of two Oregon
ballot pamphlets-1908, 126 pages; 1910, 210 pages); Holman, supra note 100, at 282;
McCall, supra note 95, at 170-73; Munro, supra note 74, at 34-35. See text accompanying
note 86 supra.
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legislature. 10 6 One critic has observed that the public cannot vote as
intelligently as its representatives, who by profession are better quali-
fied to make policy decisions. 10 7 A final factor that may assist special
interests in influencing direct legislation is the inherent prejudice of
the voters. Review of an early initiative and referendum elections, for
example, revealed distinct prejudices against corporations and in favor
of labor, so long as the workers were not part of a powerful labor
organization.'0
Some opponents of direct legislation have urged that minority in-
terests without the resources to act as a bloc at the polls can be stifled
by the majority if direct legislation is available., " Aggravation of this
problem occurs when their needs conflict with those of powerful
special interests. Others believe direct legislation to be a misdirected
effort. The real problem, they contend, is careless selection of public
officials by the voters. 10 Opponents reason that if the people cannot
choose representatives wisely, they cannot be expected to do better in
considering numerous and complex proposals."'
D. Considerations Peculiar to States Permitting
Only Constitutional Initiatives"2
If a state permits amendment by initiative of its constitution and
does not permit statutory initiative, several considerations suggest that
the latter procedure also should be made available. First, when constitu-
tional amendment is the only way the voters can exercise direct law-
making power, the state's constitution may accumulate numerous pro-
visions that are statutory rather than constitutional in nature. This
phenomenon may have occurred already in Florida." 3 Inclusion in the
106. Campbell, supra note 95, at 430-31; Munro, supra note 74, at 39. See generally
S. STOUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: A CROSS-SECTION OF THE
NATION SPEAKS ITS MIND 48 (1955).
107. E. OBERHOLTZER, supra note 98, at 500.
108. Munro, supra note 74, at 37. Since inherent voter prejudices can be dispelled
only by educating the voter, the debate of issues prompted by a popular legislation
system may tend to reduce voter prejudice. See note 137 and accompanying text inIra.
109. Schumacher, Thirty Years of the People's Rule in Oregon: An Analysis, 47 POL.
Sci. Q. 242, 243 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Schumacher].
110. Munro, supra note 74, at 25.
111. R. LuCE, supra note 2, at 633.
112. Substantive suggestions and research assistance for Section III-D were provided
by the Florida State University Law Review.
113. Florida's Sunshine Amendment is the only measure enacted under Florida's
constitutional initiative provision. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8. It was proposed by Governor
Reubin Askew after repeated unsuccessful efforts to secure a strong financial disclosure
state. See Address by Governor Askew, Florida Bicentennial Democratic Convention
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state constitution of measures the legislature or Governor have stopped
from legislative enactment is not necessarily an evil in itself,114 al-
though it runs counter to an historic desire to limit the state's primary
governing document to simple and essential provisions.11 Second,
amendment of a constitutional provision is typically more difficult
than amendment of a statute,116 so an initiated amendment to the state
constitution may be difficult to change. Third, and perhaps most im-
portant, the adopted measure is constitutional as opposed to statutory
law. As a part of the supreme law of the state, such a measure overrules
all statutes with which it is in conflict, and would be on the same
level as the historic constraints on governmental action-due process
and equal protection, for example-instead of being subject to their
limitations. Indeed, it is possible that the courts might view an initiated
amendment with provisions for easy alteration 7 as more than a statute
but less than a part of the constitution. Although recognition of such
a body of subconstitutional law might avoid some of the perils of
making a measure that is statutory in nature a part of the constitution,
it would increase the uncertainty in navigating the relationships among
the different types of laws by adding yet another level to the proliferat-
ing hierarchy of laws.
Theoretically, it makes good sense to accord the voters a direct
voice in the resolution of fundamental issues normally addressed in a
state constitution while leaving to the legislature the more "technical"
issues such as those associated with statutory enactments. But as a
practical matter, it is rather difficult to describe categorically those
matters that are appropriate or inappropriate for expression in the
state's constitution.118 Experiences in Florida with the constitutional
initiative concerning topics ranging from restructuring the legisla-
(Orlando, Fla., Nov. 15, 1975). It is unclear whether the Amendment should have been
included in the constitution in its entirety. On the one hand, Governor Askew obviously
felt the measure was appropriate for statutory treatment. On the other hand, a financial
disclosure law is the sort of provision that may be strongly opposed by the legislators it
regulates and should be included in the Constitution in toto to assure its preservation.
The Florida Sunshine Amendment, however, allows for modification by the legislature-
surely an unusual constitutional provision. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8(h).
114. Some items statutory in form, either by reason of their content or because of
their detail or specificity, probably belong in the constitution where they are less vulner-
able to legislative tampering. For example, items such as disclosure laws or initiative
and referendum provisions, which might be viewed as contrary to the personal interests
of the legislators, may belong in the constitution in relatively full detail.
115. See generally Sturm, supra note 7.
116. See Table I.
117. E.g., Florida's Sunshine Amendment. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8.
118. See generally Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our
Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928 (1968).
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ture"19 to financial disclosure 12° to insurance121 illustrate the difficulty
in deciding whether an initiated measure merits inclusion in the
constitution. Unfortunately, it appears there is no workable constraint
to prevent proposal of a constitutional initiative so long as its validity
depends on some constitutional precept. Because proponents of
measures that are the proper subject of statutes should not be induced
to convert their measures into constitutional initiatives, 122 the statutory
initiative should exist whenever constitutional initiative is available.
The preceding discussion suggests that the statutory initiative
should be available to prevent the abuse of the constitutional initia-
tive, but it does not follow that when constitutional initiative is avail-
able, legislative initiative must be relatively easier. Making the two
procedures equally difficult might avoid the repeated use of the easier
procedure simply to improve the chances of success at the expense of
properly categorizing measures as statutory or constitutional. Whether
an initiated proposal belongs in the state's constitution or statutory
law is a question for the citizens alone to decide; no branch of govern-
ment, even the courts, should be permitted to intervene.
IV. EXPERIENCE OF THOSE STATES PERMITTING DIRECT LEGISLATION
More than a half century of experience affords some concrete data
that can be applied to the arguments for and against direct legisla-
tion. Commentators have observed that initiative and referendum
119. In 1970, petitions were circulated proposing a unicameral legislature for Florida.
That effort was thwarted by a Florida Supreme Court declaration that a separate petition
and separate amendment would be necessary to eradicate each reference in the constitu-
tion to the bicameral scheme. Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 831 (Fla. 1970). Although
art. XI, § 3 later was amended to permit "revision or amendment of any portion or
portions" of the constitution, thus overruling Adams, the petition drive for a unicameral
legislature was not revived.
120. See note 113 supra.
121. Dissatisfied with the 1977 state legislature's rejection of his proposed insurance
program, see The Florida Times-Union, Aug. 10, 1977, § B, at 2, col. 1; id. May 19,
1977, § A, at 1, col. 2, and unsuccessful in his efforts to persuade Governor Askew to
veto the insurance program enacted by the 1977 Legislature, see id., June 5, 1977, § B,
at 3, col. 1, Florida Insurance Commissioner William Gunter announced he would utilize
the constitutional initiative to secure the approval of his proposed package. See, e.g.,
Miami Herald, April 22, 1977, § A, at 20, col. 1; Florida Times-Union, Aug. 10, 1977,
§ B, at 2, col. 1. Commissioner Gunter's apparent preference for statutory enactment and
the relatively narrow scope of his proposal suggest that the proposed insurance program
may not be suitable for the state's constitution. On the other hand, the insurance plan
proposes elimination of a right to recover damages for pain and suffering in automobile
accidents. Because the Florida Supreme Court has invalidated similar statutes in the
past under the access-to-courts theory, Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla.
1974), a constitutional amendment would obviate another invalidation. See generally
Note, Access to Courts, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 871 (1977).
122. E.g., Florida's Sunshine Amendment. FLA. CONSr. art. II, § 8(h).
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generally prompted lawmakers to be more attuned to the will of the
electorate 2 ' and to abstain from the passage of radical legislation.'12
Greater participation in government by public-minded citizens has not
occurred to the extent envisioned by supporters, apparently because
initiative and referendum have been used less often than at first ex-
pected.1 2' Direct legislation has promoted voter education, but probably
not to the extent claimed by early advocates. 126 For example, the only
commentator who considered whether direct legislation stimulated
public interest decided that it has not: voter ignorance was reflected in
statistics indicating inconsistent votes cast on related measures, votes
cast "no" more often than "yes," and frequent abstentions on direct
legislation while votes were cast for candidates for public office. 12 7
Studies tend to reveal far more about the validity of critics' pre-
dicted effects of initiative and referendum. Direct legislation has not
damaged representative government as feared,"2 although some legisla-
tures were more hesitant to enact controversial measures in the years
shortly after direct legislation was adopted. 29 Anarchy, the most feared
result of direct legislation, has never resulted, and social welfare legisla-
tion has been created by the legislatures, not via the initiative." 0
Criticism directed at the operation of the direct legislation process
itself has been substantiated in large part. A number of abuses have
occurred that were not foreseen by the friends or foes of direct legisla-
tion. For example, a number of "giveaway" bills that had little likeli-
hood of being enacted were placed on the ballot by political minority
groups in California in the 1940's."' These outlandish proposals
prompted one commentator to propose that there be only an "indirect"
123. R. LucE, supra note 2, at 632; Key & Crouch, The Initiative and Referendum
In California, 6 PUBLICATION OF U.C.L.A. IN THE SOC. SCIENCES 423, 574-75 (1939)
[hereinafter cited as Key & Crouch]. Key and Crouch indicated that legislatures acted in
a more restrained manner in states offering direct legislation, but not to the extent
forecast by some proponents of direct legislation. Id. at 570.
124. Key & Crouch, supra note 123, at 574.
125. Id. at 623.
126. J. LAPALOMBRA, supra note 83, at 120; Munro, supra note 74, at 22.
127. Schumacher, supra note 109, at 258.
128. R. LUCE, supra note 2, at 621-22.
129. J. BARNETT, THE OPERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL IN
OREGON 169 (1915) [hereinafter cited as J. BARNETT]; cf. Rappard, supra note 84, at 364-65
(recognizing Swiss legislators' timidity and suggesting it would be corrected by use of
the initiative process).
130. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 88, at 553-61 (a list by title of all initiative peti-
tions passed in California between 1912 and 1975 reflecting only two successful initiatives
suggestive of social welfare).
131. Some of these bills bore appropriate nicknames such as "Thirty on Thursday"
and "Ham and Eggs." Smith, Can We Afford the Initiative?, 38 NAT'L MUN. REV. 437
(1949).
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initiative, whereby all proposed measures would have to be considered
by the legislature before being placed on a ballot.132 Under the in-
direct method, the legislature could propose an alternative measure,
which would also appear on the ballot. Because the indirect process
takes longer and stimulates more legislative debate, it also gives the
voters an opportunity to consider the proposal more fully. 33 Other un-
expected subjects have been placed on the ballot simply for polltaking
purposes, a practice used most frequently during the social unrest of
the 1960's.13 4 Less obvious abuses, such as public misrepresentation,'3 5
"backscratching" between urban centers in a state,'3 6 and needless cir-
cumvention of the legislature137 also have occurred sporadically." 8
The quality, in terms of both draftmanship and content, of laws
adopted through the initiative process generally has equalled that of
laws passed by the state legislature. 39 The fear that poorly conceived
and prepared measures would reach the ballot, was however, not
totally unfounded,'" so the electorate probably should be credited
with being able to recognize and reject unintelligent proposals con-
sistently.
The claim that the direct legislation process would be just another
medium for special interest politics has proved to be one of the most
accurate. Initiative and referendum, however, do serve as a check on
special interest groups.'' The power of special interests to affect the
direct legislation process coupled with the ability of the public to
recognize and reject self-serving proposals made by special interest
groups has produced a standoff: generally, neither the average voters
132. Id. at 442.
133. Id. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
134. See 5 CAL. W.L. REV. 148 (1968); 3 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 183 (1967); 1968
UTAH L. REV. 464.
135. Diamond, supra note 88, at 463. This problem and others prompted passage of
the California Political Reform Act of 1974. Id.; see notes 146-47 and accompanying text
infra.
136. J. BARNETr, supra note 129, at 23-24. This author indicates that on at least
several occasions the electorate of one Oregon city, expecting reciprocity in the future,
would support a measure favoring another city.
137. Munro, supra note 74, at 19. Many measures that the author believed would
have been enacted by the Oregon legislature were never placed before it.
138. For a compilation of subjects considered by one state's electorate, see Diamond,
supra note 88, at 553-61.
139. J. "LAPALOMBRA, supra note 83, at 111-12 (suggesting that legislative bill
drafters for the special interests will be equally careful in drafting initiatives); cf. R.
LuCE, supra note 2, at 628, citing J. BAss, THE GOVERNMENT OF OKLAHOMA 30 (n.d.)
(early direct legislation in Oklahoma was neither radical nor hastily done.); Key &
Crouch, supra note 123, at 565 (suggesting that the measures adopted in California
reflect careful consideration by the voters).
140. See notes 102-04 and accompanying text supra.
141. J. LAPALOMBRA, supra note 83, at 117-19.
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nor the powerful special interests have allowed enactment of measures
injurious to them.142 On the other hand, measures which are opposed
primarily by the inertial attitudes of government bureaucrats and those
which only incidentally favor special interests find success at the polls.14
In spite of the power wielded by special interests, the use of the initia-
tive process has forced public debate and brought new problems and
issues to public attention.1" The ability of special interests to block
legislation by propaganda campaigns may be offset considerably by the
appearance of citizens' action groups . 45 Recently California voters broke
through the special interest barrier in passing the Political Reform Act
of 1974.146 This Act, which received nearly seventy percent of the vote,
has been described as the most comprehensive reform in California
politics since adoption of initiative and referendum in 1911.'
The alleged shortcomings of direct legislation that would facilitate
control by special interests also have been substantiated to a consider-
able degree. In the two studies considered, more than twenty-five per-
cent of those who voted at general elections did not vote on initiative
or referendum measures on the ballot. 4 Commentators have con-
cluded from these figures that more voters feel competent to vote for
political candidates than for measures, 49 and that well-organized
special interests have too much power, whether or not that power is
exercised."10 Proponents have countered that a minority of all qualified
voters usually select representatives anyway,"' and it is a sign of voter
intelligence to abstain when a measure is not understood. A study
indicating that simpler measures receive more votes suggests that
142. Key & Crouch, supra note 123, at 567, 569.
143. Id. at 567, 573.
144. J. LAPALOMBRA, supra note 83, at 110.
145. For example, the following groups banded together to draft and promote
the Political Reform Act, discussed in note 135 supra and text accompanying notes 146-
47 infra: People's Lobby, Office of the California Secretary of State, California Common
Cause, NAACP, Ripon Society, Sierra Club, Women for the Political Reform Act, Na-
tional Women's Political Caucus, Stamp Out Smog, Forum on Open Government,
American Friend's Service Committee on Legislation, and Ralph Nader's California
Citizen Action Group. Diamond, supra note 88, at 463 n.41.
146. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 81000-91014 (West 1976); see Diamond, supra note 88.
147. Diamond, supra note 88, at 454; see Steck, California Legislation: Sources Un-
limited, 6 PAC. L.J. 536, 545 (1975).
148. Schumacher, supra note 109, at 245 (based on 30 years' experience in Oregon);
Address by Arthur Schwartz, director of Ohio Legislative Reference Bureau (40 years'
Ohio experience), to National Conference on Government (Nov. 28, 1951), printed in 41
NAT'L MUN. REV. 142, 145 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz Address].
149. Schumacher, supra note 109, at 245-46.
150. Key & Crouch, supra note 123, at 572; Schumacher, supra note 109, at 257. To
illustrate, it was found that over a period of 30 years two-thirds of all measures were
adopted or rejected by a minority of Oregon voters. Id. at 252.
151. J. LAPALOMBRA, supra note 83, at 112-14.
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proposal complexity, as well as voter apathy, reduces voter participa-
tion. 152
In the past, many voters who have not understood a measure have
guessed, voted "no," or voted to perpetuate the status quo.1 53 During
the early years of direct legislation, both the complexity and the large
number of ballot proposals rendered proper voter consideration an
impossibility.1 54 The smaller number of direct legislation measures on
recent ballots 55 plus the distribution of voter pamphlets, "56 however,
probably has resulted in better voter understanding.
The majority generally has not vented its prejudices through the
direct legislation process (as some had feared), and the courts have not
hesitated to invalidate objectionable laws adopted through use of the
initiative. 57 Indeed, direct legislation can function effectively as a
medium for agitation by minorities that lack the political clout to pre-
vail at the polls. While these minorities may not succeed immediately,
their needs become widely known and no longer can be ignored by
state legislators.1
V. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The strongest practical' 59 criticism of direct legislation is that it
does not alleviate the distortion of the political process caused by
special interest groups. Experience has shown, however, that the voters
can distinguish self-serving special interest legislation and almost uni-
formly reject it. 6 Perhaps a more serious problem is posed by the
measure that is not intended to meet the selfish needs of a special
interest, but simply may be unwise legislation. Fortunately, many
such measures never appear on the ballot because inadequate voter
interest exists to obtain the required petition signatures. Because of
the cumbersome process that must be hurdled before a measure is
placed on the ballot, no measure without considerable voter appeal or
152. Schumacher, supra note 109, at 247.
153. Id. at 251.
154. BARNETr, supra note 129, at 91.
155. See Diamond, supra note 88, at 553-61; Schwartz Address supra note 148, at 145.
156. Voter ballot pamphlets typically are distributed to voters shortly before election
day. The pamphlet explains the measure in detail and includes arguments for each side.
See e.g., CAL. ELEc. CODE § 3567.5.
157. For an example of recent state supreme court activity, see Diamond, supra note
88, at 460 & n.33. The initiated statute has a presumption of validity equal only to a
legislative statute. See text accompanying notes 65-69 supra.
158. Key & Crouch, supra note 123, at 569.
159. The theoretical positions set forth in text accompanying notes 82-122 supra
cannot be resolved in an empirical review such as this. Because the concepts are not
mutually exclusive, it seems unnecessary to take a position on the question.
160. See notes 141-42 and accompanying text supra.
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the support of special interests is likely to succeed. Voter education is
another key to the effectiveness of direct legislation. Some of the
electorate has voted unintelligently in the past, but not in sufficient
numbers to enact any of the more undesirable measures considered.
The indirect initiative'" clearly would ameliorate the voter education
problem by giving the legislature a chance to propose an alternative
to the voters.1 6 2 Although the corruption of legislatures at the beginning
of this century prompted the adoption of direct legislation, the honesty
and intelligence of the legislature at any given time should not be the
primary measure in considering whether to adopt a direct legislation
procedure. Rather, the enduring issues that focus on the workability
of direct legislation should be decisive.
Unanswered questions remain regarding the wisdom of providing
for statewide initiative and referendum. Although experience suggests
that the people have not acted brashly through direct legislation, the
continuance of that record is hardly guaranteed. Furthermore, the
legislator, even if subject to intense pressure from special interests,
may legislate in a consistently superior fashion because of experience
and insight.
Direct legislation procedures encourage greater responsiveness by
legislatures to the desires of the electorate. If the voters have the power
to act when the legislature does not act, legislators would feel that
their actions were under closer scrutiny and would pay closer attention
to the concerns of their constituents. Even if a legislator felt he must
vote his conscience rather than the desires of his constituents, the
threat of action through direct legislation would prompt the legislator
to explain his reasons to the electorate more fully.
An additional argument in favor of the statutory initiative ap-
plicable to states such as Florida that already permit constitutional
initiatives, is premised on the views that the state constitution should
contain only fundamental measures 168 and that all but a small propor-
tion of a state's laws should take the form of statutes or regulations.
The absence of a statutory initiative channels the impetus for direct
legislation into the constitution.164
The initiative and referendum power is by no means a panacea for
the ills of government. Certainly the success of direct legislation pro-
161. See notes 31-35 and accompanying text supra.
162. For a discussion of the merits of indirect initiative, see Note, The California
Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 922 (1975).
163. See generally Grad, supra note 119; Sturm, supra note 7.
164. For example, this diversion of statutory measures may have occurred in Florida.
Commissioner Gunter's insurance proposal is the best example. See note 122 supra.
Florida's Sunshine Amendment, because it can be amended by the legislature, possibly
should have been a statute also.
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cedures depends upon the degree of public dedication to better govern-
ment, and the procedures can never be invoked without considerable
resources and assertive civic leaders. The inherent shortcomings of
direct legislation, however, are no greater than those encountered in
the legislative mode. The potential benefits achievable through afford-
ing a direct popular voice in the government and encouraging increased
responsiveness on the part of the legislature are worth the possible
costs.
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